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Abstract
This paper describes the rationale followed for the integration of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-
inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system, into two rather diﬀerent cognitive
architectures, such as ACT-R and CLARION. The provided integration shows how the repre-
sentational and reasoning mechanisms implemented by our framework may be plausibly applied
to computational models of cognition based on diﬀerent assumptions.
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1 Introduction
In this work we illustrate how the knowledge representation and reasoning systemDual-PECCS,1
aimed at performing the conceptual categorization tasks, was integrated into two diﬀerent cog-
nitive architectures: ACT-R [1] and CLARION [2]. Our system represents a unifying suite,
where diﬀerent sorts of cognitively-inspired common-sense reasoning (prototypical reasoning and
exemplars-based reasoning) and standard monotonic categorization procedures are integrated
and autonomously executed according to the stimulus being categorized. Although potentially
conﬂicting, these diﬀerent types of reasoning are harmonized according to the theoretical tenets
coming from the dual process theories [3]. On the other hand, from a representational perspec-
tive, the system relies on the hypothesis that concepts are “heterogeneous proxytypes” [4]. This
work is organized as follows: in Section 2 we sketch the main elements inspiring our system
and its theoretical bases as well as its overall architecture, in Section 3 we show how our hybrid
system for conceptual categorization was integrated into ACT-R and CLARION, and ﬁnally
we elaborate on the future works.
1So named after ‘Dual Prototypes and Exemplars-based Conceptual Categorization System’.
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2 Heterogeneous Proxytypes and Dual Process Model of
Categorization
As mentioned, the two main theoretical cornerstones inspiring our system are the heterogeneous
proxyxtypes approach and the dual process theory of reasoning and rationality. According to
the ‘heterogeneous proxytypes’ approach (for a detailed account, please refer to [4]), conceptual
structures in cognitive systems and architectures are assumed to be formed by heterogeneous
representations (or bodies of knowledge) referring to the same conceptual entity. That is, the
diﬀerent bodies of knowledge act as ‘semantic pointers’ in the sense intended by [5] towards
the same reference concept. Each body of knowledge provides speciﬁc types of information
and speciﬁc access and reasoning procedures to the concept they refer to. Such heterogeneous
representations are ‘proxytypes’ [6], in the sense that they can be contextually activated by
external stimuli, coming from the environment, and ‘go proxy’, in working memory, for their
reference category. The proxyﬁcation may be then the result of activities such as concept
identiﬁcation, recognition, retrieval, and so forth. This approach also allows to tackle the
problem of the ‘contextual activation’ of knowledge: i.e., given a speciﬁc perceived stimulus
to be categorized, only a speciﬁc portion of the available conceptual knowledge is activated
(speciﬁcally, only what is “contextually relevant” w.r.t. the stimulus at hand). In other terms,
according to this perspective we only proxyfy (i.e., activate in our working memory) the type
of representation which is closer to the percept (see [4] for further details).
The diﬀerent types of conceptual representations hypothesized to co-exist in the heteroge-
neous proxytypes approach are typicality-based representations of a given concept, as well as
representations in terms of necessary and/or suﬃcient conditions. The typicality-based rep-
resentations included in this approach regard not only prototypes but also exemplars-based
representations of a given category.2 In this respect, Dual-PECCS is then equipped with
a hybrid knowledge base composed of heterogeneous representations for the same conceptual
entities: that is, for a given concept the hybrid knowledge base includes prototypes, exemplars
and classical representations (representations in terms of necessary and suﬃcient conditions).
For example: the heterogeneous representation of the concept tiger includes prototypical and
exemplar-based representations semantically pointing to the same conceptual entity, as well as a
representation encoding necessary information. Namely, the prototypical representation grasps
information such as that tigers are wild animals, their fur in most cases has yellow and black
stripes, etc.; the exemplar-based representations grasp information on individuals, such as a
given individual of white-tiger, which is a particular tiger with white fur. On the other hand,
the classical body of knowledge is ﬁlled with necessary and suﬃcient information to characterize
the concept representing, for example, the taxonomic information that a tiger is a mammal and
a carnivore.
From a reasoning perspective the retrieval of such representations is driven by diﬀerent
process types. In particular, prototype and exemplar-based retrieval is based on a fast and
approximate kind of categorization, and beneﬁts from common-sense information associated to
concepts.3 On the other hand, the retrieval of classical representation of concepts is featured
2According to the exemplars perspective, a given category is mentally represented as set of speciﬁc exemplars
explicitly stored within memory: e.g., the mental representation of the concept cat is the set of the representations
of (some of) the cats we encountered during our past experience. For a detailed review regarding the diﬀering
theories about concepts, prototypes and exemplars, please refer to [7, 8].
3Let us assume that we have to categorize a stimulus with the following features: “it has fur, woofs and
wags its tail”. In this case, the result of a prototype-based categorization would be dog, since these cues are
associated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, however, is not the only type of reasoning based
on typicality. In fact, if an exemplar corresponding to the stimulus being categorized is available, too, it is
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by explicit rule following, and makes no use of common-sense information. These two diﬀering
categorization strategies have been widely studied in psychology of reasoning in the frame of
the dual process theory, that postulates the co-existence of two diﬀerent types of cognitive
systems [3]. The systems of the ﬁrst type (type 1 ) are phylogenetically older, unconscious,
automatic, associative, parallel and fast. The systems of the second type (type 2 ) are more
recent, conscious, sequential and slow, and featured by explicit rule following. We assume that
both systems can be composed in turn by many sub-systems and processes. Following the
hypotheses in [9, 10], the heterogeneous conceptual representation of our system includes, then,
two main sorts of components that are based on diﬀerent types of representations and that share
these two sorts of processes: Type 1 processes have been designed to deal with prototypes- and
exemplar-based retrieval and categorization, while Type 2 processes have been designed to deal
with deductive inference.
The two sorts of system processes interact, since Type 1 processes are executed ﬁrst and
their results are then reﬁned by Type 2 processes. In the implemented system the typical
representational and reasoning functions are assigned to the System 1 (hereafter S1), which
executes processes of Type 1, and is associated to the Conceptual Spaces framework [11], where
the reasoning functions are implemented as similarity calculations in a metric space. On the
other hand, the classical representational and reasoning functions are assigned to the System
2 (hereafter S2) to execute processes of Type 2, and are associated to a standard Description
Logics based ontological representation (in our case the OpenCyc ontology containing more
than 230K concepts was used). The details of such integrated framework as well as the results
of diﬀerent experiments can be found in [12, 13]. In the next section we brieﬂy describe the
categorization pipeline of the system by presenting the dynamics of the interaction between S1
and S2 processes; a fuller account of this process is documented in [14].
2.1 Categorization Pipeline of the DUAL-PECCS
The whole categorization pipeline of the systems works as follows. The current input to the
system is a simple linguistic description, like ‘The animal that eats bananas’, and the expected
output is a given category evoked by the description (the category monkey in this case).
The system answers rely on the the output of S1 and S2, respectively. The categorization
provided by S1 is based on approximate, defeasible, inference and is error prone. It runs on the
conceptual spaces framework and implements both forms of typicality based reasoning: proto-
type and exemplar based categorization. In particular, according to the linguistic stimulus being
categorized Dual-PECCS chooses, based on a similarity calculation between the stimulus and
the typical representations available in S1 knowledge base, whether to select an exemplar or a
prototype (we refer to this process as S1 categorization). By following a preference that has
been experimentally observed in human cognition [15], our algorithm favors the results of the
exemplars-based categorization if the knowledge-base stores any exemplars similar to the input
being categorized. Once the result of S1 is selected (i.e., either a prototype or an exemplar
is proxyﬁed in working memory), such approximate categorization result is then checked with
the ontological knowledge base of S2 (we refer to this process as S1-S2 categorization). This
check is implemented by type 2 processes, and it is therefore based on deductive inference. If
the categorization result provided by S1 (based on the similarity calculation between the in-
put and S1 representations) is consistent with the ontology, then the categorization succeeded
acknowledged that humans use to classify it by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t.
the prototype associated to the underlying concepts [8]. This type of common sense categorization is known in
literature as exemplars-based categorization.
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and the category provided by S2 is returned along with the top scoring class returned by S1.
Otherwise, the system evaluates a ﬁxed amount of S1 candidates, meantime keeping track of
the inconsistent elements: in case all such candidates are inconsistent w.r.t. the ontology in
S2, the output of S2, computed independently of S1, is returned along with the top scoring
class initially returned by S1. The control strategy implements a tradeoﬀ between ontological
inference and the output of S1, which is more informative but also formally less reliable.
3 Integrating Dual-PECCS into ACT-R and CLARION
The proposed system has been integrated into two of the most widely known cognitive architec-
tures: ACT-R [1] and CLARION [2]. The underlying rationale behind such integration eﬀorts
is to investigate whether our approach is compatible with architectures implementing diﬀerent
cognitive theories of mind; in this case, it can be considered a candidate general framework for
representing and reasoning on conceptual information, and eventually tested with even further
architectures.
One main diﬀerence between the two architectures is that CLARION natively assumes the
perspective of the dual process theory; ACT-R, on the other hand, is not natively dual process
based. Therefore, in the latter architecture, the dual mechanisms of reasoning needed to be
explicitly designed and instantiated within an already existing general framework. In particular,
in ACT-R cognitive mechanisms emerge from the interaction of two types of knowledge: the
declarative knowledge, that encodes explicit facts that the system knows, and the procedural
knowledge, that encodes rules for processing declarative knowledge. The declarative module
is used to store and retrieve pieces of information called chunks, that are featured by a type
and a set of attribute-value pairs, similar to frame slots. Finally, the central production system
connects these modules by using a set of IF-THEN production rules.
Diﬀerently, in CLARION, cognitive processes are mainly subject to the activity of two sub-
systems, called Action Centered Sub-system (ACS) and the Non-Action Centered Sub-system
(NACS). Both sub-systems store information using a two-layered architecture, i.e., they both
include an explicit and an implicit level of representation. The working memory, acting as
temporary storage for decision making, is a part of the ACS, which also maintains the active
behavior strategies. To hold general knowledge, the NACS provides a semantic memory consist-
ing of both a rule-based layer that encodes explicit, symbolic knowledge, and of an underlying
distributed layer with implicit, sub-symbolic representations. For both architectures we mainly
focused on the Declarative Memory and Working Memory buﬀers, and on the corresponding
retrieval mechanisms.
Besides, the dual process strategies of concept categorization have been integrated into
the ACT-R and CLARION processes and connected to the retrieval request executed in the
Working Memory. In the Extended Declarative Memory (equivalent to its counterpart, NACS,
in CLARION) every concept is represented as an empty chunk (that is, a chunk having no
associated information, except for itsWordNet synset ID and a human readable name), referred
to by the external bodies of knowledge (prototypes and exemplars) acting like semantic pointers.
The novel dual process-based categorization mechanism triggers both the S1 categorization
and the S1-S2 categorization procedures. In this setting, when the categorization result of S1
is returned, the representation activated in the Extended Declarative Long Term Memory is
proxyﬁed (i.e., recalled to the working memory) in order to perform the S2 consistency check,
in the dual process perspective.
As regards as the ACT-R implementation, we have integrated our hybrid knowledge base
directly into the declarative memory, diﬀerently from other approaches that have extended the
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Figure 1: ACT-R Architecture with the used modules in dotted frames (left side), adapted
from [1]; CLARION cognitive architecture with the working memory and the declarative mem-
ory emphasized through shaded frames (right side), adapted from [16].
knowledge capabilities of ACT-R based on the introduction of a new, ad-hoc, external module
of declarative memory [17, 18]. We designed a novel retrieval request implementing the S1-S2
categorization mechanism by extending the repertoire of the retrieval buﬀer through a new
action (symbolized by the operator $). Such action allows a direct access to the heterogeneous
information represented by the S1-S2 external bodies of knowledge. We designed two types of
$ requests that are executed according to the speciﬁc type of request received from the retrieval
buﬀer, the approximate categorization request and the consistency request. The approximate
categorization request is activated when the retrieval request is generic (the request chunk does
not contain a ﬁller for the concept id slot), and does not include information about the concept
type to be retrieved (this task is similar to the open request that is possible to execute in
ACT-R [19]).
This kind of request triggers the S1 retrieval system, and its output of a classiﬁcation request
is a chunk-like translation of the exemplar or the prototype resulting from the execution of the
S1 retrieval on the typicality-based knowledge. We introduced the conceptual ﬁnsts, by building
on the notion of declarative ﬁnsts [20] delivered in ACT-R, to keep track of the representations
that have been recently retrieved by the system S1. In our implementation, conceptual ﬁnsts
allow S1 to exclude the elements already inspected and found inconsistent by S2. On the
other hand, if the $ request speciﬁes the concept to which it refers, then we are dealing with
a consistency check request, to be sent to the S2 system (i.e., we want to know whether the
category assigned by S1 is compliant with a general ontological model): in this case, if the
$ request chunk contains a ﬁller for the concept id slot, we convert the request and redirect
it to the S2 system that checks whether the features of the chunk are compatible with the
proposed classiﬁcation. The output of this request is a chunk where the slot concept id is ﬁlled
with the conceptual representation resulting from S2. The integration at the representational
and reasoning level in CLARION followed the same rationale indicated in ACT-R, but it has
been adapted to the speciﬁc requirements of the architecture. In particular, we adopted both
implicit and explicit representational layers provided by the NACS in order to create a direct
mapping with our hybrid architecture: S1 (and its typicality-based information represented with
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conceptual spaces) has been mapped onto the implicit layer, while S2 (the classical, ontology-
based representation, has been mapped onto the explicit one). The mapping between the
sub-symbolic module of CLARION and the dimension-based representations of the conceptual
spaces has been favored, since such architecture also synthesizes the implicit information in
terms of dimensions-values pairs. The dual process based categorization mechanisms have been
implemented based on the following procedure: every request is encoded in working memory
as a particular type of instance (instance chunk). The dimensions and values of every instance
chunk are ﬁlled through an update of the implicit module with the information extracted from
the external stimulus (in the present case a linguistic description). Such process is executed
in the ACS module, and it is arranged as a series of rounds, each producing a query to the
implicit S1 component and to the explicit S2 module. The ACS module initializes the input
layer of the S1 module, based on the instance chunk being considered. This initialization
requires to handle external stimuli (the world) along with internal information, at disposal
of CLARION agents. Let us start from the sensory input space: this space represents the
agent’s percepts, and is encoded as a set of pairs 〈dimension,value〉. Populating the sensory
input space (and therefore building the instance chunk for the request to be sent to the NACS
declarative memory) involves adding the appropriate set of 〈dimension,value〉 pairs (when such
information, extracted from the input stimuli, is available). Filling a value of a dimension in
CLARION is based on the sub-symbolic activation of that dimension when the external input
is processed. In our implementation, the available dimensions that a chunk can assume is based
on the set of dimensions deﬁned in [13] for encoding Conceptual Spaces (therefore the internal
information that CLARION can process is ﬁxed). It is worth noting that the activated chunk
can lack of some information (i.e., a dimension not ﬁlled with its corresponding value), since
by deﬁnition percepts include noisy or partially missing information. After building the chunk
request, a retrieval request is executed on the S1 knowledge base, with the aim at retrieving
an exemplar or a prototype-based representation. The obtained S1 result is then proxyﬁed and
temporarily stored in working memory, and checked, as previously illustrated, with the external
S2 knowledge base, the Cyc ontology.
4 Conclusions
We have illustrated the integration between the representational and reasoning assumptions
presented in theDual-PECCS with the ACT-R and CLARION representational and reasoning
modules. Such integration has shown a good level of compatibility with two general cognitive
systems making diﬀerent theoretical assumptions about the architecture of human cognition.
As a future work, we plan to integrate the proposed representational and reasoning framework
into further general cognitive architectures (e.g., SOAR, Micro PSI, OpenCog). Such set of
integrations, should it prove to be feasible, will allow us to simulate brain disorders related
to the activation and retrieval of conceptual information. Disorders such as the Semantic
Dementia can be thought, in fact, as involving access to conceptual structures that inhibit,
in diﬀerent ways, the “proxyﬁcation” process of the diﬀerent representational elements of our
hybrid framework.
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